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There is little current information regarding the long-term persistence of health spending in the 
United States, in particular among the population aged under 65 (pre-Medicare eligibility). We de-
scribe and model the extent of persistence over a six-year period (2003–08) using medical and 
pharmacy claims for over 3 million employees, retirees and dependants derived from the Truven 
Health MarketScan database. Overall, substantial persistence in spending exists, particularly at the 
extremes of the distribution and for pharmaceutical spending. Error components models are esti-
mated to separate transient from persistent variation in spending, and dynamic probit models are 
estimated to assess the predictive power of demographic and co-morbid conditions and prior high 
spending in determining the likelihood of future high spending. A better understanding of the persis-
tence of health spending can inform the selection and evaluation of appropriate interventions to 
address high costs, and can help forecast the likelihood and severity of adverse selection in public 
and private programmes. 
Policy points 
 This study adds substantially to knowledge about the long-term persistence of health spending 
and the predictors of persistently high spending in the under-age-65 population with private in-
surance. 
 The incidence of health spending, the potential for adverse selection in insurance markets and 
the optimal design of insurance features such as annual deductibles depend on the extent to 
which high spending persists over time at the individual level. 
 Interventions to address high health spending would differ depending on the extent to which it 
is expected to persist over time. 
I. Introduction 
Given the low probability of high-cost health events over a short period of time, it is not surprising 
that the spending distribution is highly skewed within a single year. However, long-term spending 
patterns in the United States, particularly in the under-65 population which is the target of Afforda-
ble Care Act (ACA) coverage expansions, remain poorly understood. Existing studies based on broad-
ly representative data sets, such as the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), have limited 
follow-up (the MEPS is a two-year panel). As a result, research on longer-term spending patterns has 
generally relied on single-employer or single-insurer data sets or has involved the Medicare popula-
tion (aged 65 and over). In addition, most existing studies rely on data from the 1980s or 1990s.  
Knowledge of the extent and correlates of persistence in health spending can inform the design of 
appropriate insurance products and public policies to ensure adequate coverage. First, such infor-
mation is highly relevant to insurers who are concerned about adverse selection. For example, if 
high spending often arises quickly, low current expenditures will not strongly signal low future ex-
penditures. Therefore, currently healthy individuals may hesitate to opt out of ACA-mandated cov-
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erage because of the risk that an unexpected short-term spending spike may occur before they are 
able to get coverage in the next open enrolment window. Conversely, if persistence is relatively high, 
risk selection could threaten the functioning of health insurance exchanges established under the 
ACA as a marketplace in which individuals without employer group coverage can purchase insurance 
and obtain income-based premium subsidies. Second, understanding which individuals are at great-
est risk of persistently high spending can inform regulators attempting to detect and manage risk 
selection by insurers. Third, given the concentration of spending among a small percentage of pa-
tients, the success of cost-control measures strongly depends on the ability to identify people likely 
to become perpetually high spenders and modify their care trajectories. Moreover, the evaluation of 
interventions targeting high spenders (sometimes called ‘hot spotters’) depends critically on an ac-
curate understanding on whether high spenders would have become low spenders over time even in 
the absence of any intervention. Fourth, the extent of household financial risk and the long-term 
incidence of medical spending depend strongly on the persistence of high spending. The rapid in-
crease in the prevalence of high-deductible health plans in the US illustrates this potential impact. If 
high spending is transient, an individual might exceed the deductible in a particular year but retain 
the ability to diversify such risk over time. Conversely, persistent high spending can leave some indi-
viduals effectively underinsured over time under a high-deductible plan. Reduced cost sharing for 
high-value services used by chronically ill people could help address this financial risk and discourage 
the underuse of clinically important services that could result from high cost-sharing burdens. 
Hirth et al. (2015) described the long-term concentration and persistence of spending in the US pri-
vately-insured, under-age-65 population, as well as cross-sectional (baseline) correlates of different 
patterns of spending dynamics. Their first key finding was fairly high persistence at both ends of the 
spending distribution. At the low end, over a six-year period, 69.8 per cent of enrollees never had 
annual spending in the top 10 per cent of the distribution and the bottom 50 per cent of spenders 
accounted for less than 10 per cent of total spending. At the high end, those in the top 10 per cent 
were almost as likely (34.4 per cent) to be in the top 10 per cent five years later as one year later 
(43.4 per cent). A second key finding was that many co-morbid conditions measured at baseline re-
tained much of their predictive power even five years later. 
This paper builds on these descriptive analyses and extends them in two main directions. First, we 
include an important part of the population aged 65 and over that has not been extensively studied 
– namely, those with employer-provided retiree supplements to standard Medicare coverage. Se-
cond, we explore more sophisticated econometric strategies to analyse persistence of health spend-
ing. The primary objective of the econometric analyses is not to test the relative performance of 
models in our particular data set (most of the models are not nested in a way that would readily fa-
cilitate such comparisons), but rather to demonstrate several modelling options that could each be 
appropriate in particular contexts. Such a demonstration will highlight the types of questions that 





can be answered and the types of inferences/interpretations of findings that could be drawn using 
each class of model. 
Our primary econometric analyses employ two broad types of dynamic panel models. First, we con-
sider error components models such as those in van Vliet (1992), designed for continuous depend-
ent variables (for example, expenditures), in which the temporal dependence is modelled via 
autoregressive and moving-average terms within a composite error. Such models are of primary in-
terest when a researcher (or an enrollee, insurer, employer or policymaker) wants to make projec-
tions about actual insurance programme outlays. The second type of model is designed for discrete 
dependent variables (for example, expenditure categories). In particular, we use dynamic discrete 
choice panel data models.1 Such models are of primary interest when a researcher (or an enrollee, 
insurer, employer or policymaker) wants to draw more qualitative inferences about spending levels 
and their dynamics over time. They are also of interest for use in data sets where spending is only 
reported categorically, or in analyses of health care consumption patterns based on discrete utilisa-
tion measures (for example, hospitalisations). In addition, given the highly skewed nature of most 
health spending data, discrete models are less subject to concern over the influence of outlier cases 
on the estimates.  
Section II reviews the related literature. Section III describes the data used in this study. Results are 
reported in Sections IV and V, with the dynamic modelling appearing in Section V. Finally, Section VI 
concludes. 
II. Related literature 
Several studies of spending persistence focus on the population aged 65 and over, using data from 
the traditional, fee-for-service Medicare programme. Garber, MaCurdy and McClellan (1998) found 
considerable turnover at the top of the spending distribution. Among enrollees who were in the top 
5 per cent in one year, 15.2 per cent remained in the top 5 per cent the following year and only 8.8 
per cent remained in that category two years later. However, expenditure growth was concentrated 
among the highest spenders. Rettenmaier and Wang (2006) used Medicare data from 1974 to 1997 
to estimate a dynamic panel Tobit model, concluding that an additional dollar of spending in the pri-
or year resulted in $0.19 higher spending in the current year. Finally, Riley (2007) documented time 
trends in spending persistence among Medicare enrollees from 1975 to 2004, with persistence in-
creasing until the mid 1990s and then decreasing somewhat thereafter. 
Other studies focused on privately-insured individuals or the general population. Using data from a 
single employer, Eichner, McClellan and Wise (1997) found that employees in the top decile of 
spending in 1989 spent over eight times the average in that year. While their spending declined in 
the subsequent two years, it remained high (about five times the average spending in 1990 and 
 
1Honoré and Kyriazidou, 2000; Wooldridge, 2005. 
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three times the average spending in 1991). Using data from one health maintenance organisation 
(HMO), Chapman (1997) found that of those in the top 5 per cent of the 1989 spending distribution, 
19 per cent remained in the top 5 per cent in 1990 and 14 per cent remained in the top 5 per cent in 
1991, which exceeded the persistence seen in Garber et al.’s study of the Medicare population. Co-
hen and Yu (2012) used data on the non-institutionalised US population of all ages from the 2009–10 
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey to analyse spending persistence over two years. They found that 
40 per cent of those in the top decile of spending in 2009 remained in the top decile in 2010, some-
what higher than the one-third estimated by Monheit (2003) in a similar analysis of MEPS data from 
1996–97. Finally, using an earlier sample from the same data set we use (MarketScan), Pauly and 
Zeng (2004) reported some limited information on the persistence of total spending (probability of 
remaining in the top 20 per cent of the spending distribution), finding that 46 per cent of those in 
the top quintile in 1994 remained in the top quintile in 1998. 
A recent, relevant non-US study by Kohn and Liu (2013) used the British Household Panel Survey to 
examine the persistence of health care utilisation over an 18-year period among people aged 16 and 
over. The primary findings were that past use predicted future use even after controlling for health 
and other characteristics, past utilisation was more predictive of future utilisation at older ages and 
lower health status, and baseline utilisation retained some predictive power throughout the follow-
up. 
III. Data 
The data for this project are health care claims and enrolment data for the years 2003–08 in the 
Truven Health MarketScan Research Database. Using six years of claims for a large sample of enrol-
lees allows us to improve upon previous studies in terms of timeliness, length of panel and sample 
sizes. This study received an Institutional Review Board (IRB) exemption through the University of 
Michigan IRB due to the use of secondary data.  
We use these data to examine trends in persistence of spending for commercially-insured individuals 
in the US. MarketScan represents the health care experience of employees and dependants receiv-
ing health insurance coverage through over 100, mainly self-insured, medium and large firms. These 
individuals have higher income, on average, than those not receiving insurance through an employer 
(for example, uninsured or Medicaid beneficiaries), so the results may not generalise to the entire 
under-65 population. However, because over 60 per cent of the under-65 US population receive in-
surance through an employer, the represented population is very significant in its own right and is 
the locus of many important interventions in health insurance design (for example, value-based in-
surance design) and cost containment methods (for example, disease management programmes). 
The number of individuals in the database rose from 8 million in 2003 to 41 million in 2008. Enrol-





ment was distributed broadly across the country, with employees in all 50 states and each of the 
four Census regions having at least 6.5 million covered employees or dependants in 2008. The South 
was most heavily represented (38.8 per cent). Comparisons of the MarketScan data with estimates 
for the US population from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey and the Kaiser Family Foundation 
State Health Facts reveal that the age distribution of the enrollees in the MarketScan data is similar 
to that in the population with employer-sponsored coverage. Comparisons with Census data reveal 
that the gender distribution of the MarketScan data is similar to the distribution of individuals with 
employer-sponsored primary or supplemental insurance.2 Claims include all covered services (i.e. 
inpatient and outpatient care, prescription drugs and mental health services). Out-of-plan spending 
for items such as over-the-counter drugs and patient-borne costs such as travel to appointments is 
not represented. We follow more than 3 million enrollees for the entire six-year period from 2003 to 
2008. If a deductible is imposed, claims satisfying the deductible and falling below the deductible 
threshold are included in the database. Spending has been adjusted to 2014 dollars using the per-
sonal consumption expenditure (PCE) price index. Firm identifiers were not available in the releasa-
ble data set. 
Not surprisingly given the mobility of workers in the US and enrolment tied to employment at a giv-
en firm, attrition is common. For example, in the under-65 population, about two-thirds of the 2003 
sample could not be followed for the entire six-year period. Some attrition arises for reasons not 
likely to be endogenous to health spending, such as censoring due to employers no longer providing 
data to MarketScan (i.e. the entire group exits rather than a self-selected subset of individuals within 
the group) or children ageing out of dependant status. Other exits, such as death, retirement (with-
out continued coverage), loss of employment or taking a job with another employer, may be endog-
enous to health spending. Therefore, examining persistence of spending among those workers who 
do not exit for such reasons could cause biased estimates of spending persistence in the entire 
population of employees and dependants. Prior analyses of attrition by Hirth et al. (2015) in this 
sample concluded that the relationship with spending was relatively weak (while higher-spending 
employees were somewhat more likely to exit than employees with lower spending, higher-spending 
dependants were less likely to exit than dependants with lower spending, leaving little overall rela-
tionship between spending and exit). Although it is, by definition, not possible to examine the persis-
tence of spending post-attrition, had there been a stronger relationship with the level of spending, 
concerns about such biases would have been heightened. In addition, similar results are obtained 
when we look at those persistently high spenders (over the first three years of the sample) in terms 
of attrition during the second three years. 
Basic summary statistics are presented in Table 1 for the entire sample, and also grouped by sex and 
age in 2003 (under 25 years old, aged 25–64, and 65 and older). The 65-and-over population primari-
ly represents individuals who receive a Medicare supplement policy through a firm contributing data 
 
2Thomson Reuters, 2007; McKellar et al., 2012. 
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to MarketScan, but their spending represents the total amount paid by Medicare, the supplement 
and any out-of-pocket obligation. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Several notable spending trends emerge. Females had higher spending than males for both medical 
and prescription spending. There was substantial growth in total spending over time (58 per cent 
growth from 2003 to 2008 in total spending for the entire sample; 65 per cent growth for those aged 
65 and over). This growth partly reflects the rise in overall health spending experienced in the US 
over that period, but should be interpreted cautiously as it also reflects the impact of five years of 
ageing in this continuously-enrolled sample. Spending growth was considerably higher (70 per cent) 
for medical spending than for prescription drug spending (30 per cent).  
IV. The concentration of health spending in the cross-section and over 
time 
1. Cross-sectional distribution 
Table 2 shows the cross-sectional distribution of health spending by expenditure type. Individuals in 
the top 5 per cent of the total expenditure distribution spend $40,755 per year on average, almost 
eight times the overall average of $5,344, and constitute 45.8 per cent of all spending in our sample. 
The concentration of medical spending (the top 5 per cent account for 55.0 per cent of spending) is 
greater than the concentration of prescription drug spending (top 5 per cent account for 39.7 per 
cent). Spending is substantially less concentrated in the 65-and-over population. The top 5 per cent 
account for 34.7 per cent of spending, versus 49.3 per cent in the under-65 population. Likewise, the 
bottom 50 per cent account for nearly three times as large a share of total spending in the 65-and-
over population as in the under-65 population. Prescription drug spending is almost as concentrated 
as medical spending in the under-65 population but is much less concentrated than medical spend-
ing in the 65-and-over population.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 





2. Correlation over time 
To better understand long-term spending patterns, Table 3 shows correlations, in levels, of total 
spending and of types of spending in year t with spending in years t+1 to t+5. Overall, drug spending 
correlations are substantially higher than medical spending correlations, and decay more gradually 
over time (the drug spending correlation at five years is still two-thirds as large as it was at one year, 
while the medical spending correlation at five years is less than half as large as at one year).  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Since correlations only capture a single linear measure of co-movement, in Table 4 we present tran-
sition matrices across spending quintiles, which enable us to observe more general relationships 
across time and spending categories. The table shows that the correlation of health spending is con-
centrated in the tails of the spending distribution. Focusing on the diagonal elements, which indicate 
the probability of remaining in the same spending quintile over time, persistence is consistently 
highest at the extremes. Nearly 60 per cent of those in the highest and lowest quintiles of 2003 
spending remained in the same quintiles in 2004, substantially higher than the percentages remain-
ing in the same quintile among those in the middle quintiles. Even five years out, nearly 50 per cent 
of those in the highest and lowest quintiles of 2003 spending remained in the same quintiles in 2008. 
Transitions between the extremes (top to bottom quintile and vice versa) were uncommon as one-
year transitions (2.9 and 2.3 per cent, respectively) and remained almost as uncommon even as five-
year transitions (5.6 and 4.0 per cent, respectively). 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
In Figure 1, we present another measure of concentration in medical spending, by displaying the 
cumulative distribution function (CDF) for total health spending averaged over one, two and six 
years. The graphs show that medical spending is highly concentrated even when the data are aver-
aged across six years, which is consistent with health spending being persistent across time. Table 5 
displays related measures of the concentration of health spending over different durations: the Gini 
coefficient and the shares of total spending for the top 1 per cent and top 10 per cent of spenders. 
Consistent with earlier comparisons of the 65-and-over and under-65 populations, the Gini coeffi-
cients show greater concentration in the younger group. In addition, the concentration of spending 
drops somewhat more rapidly when going from one to six years in the older population (for exam-
ple, Gini coefficient decreases from 0.57 over one year to 0.46 over six years in the 65-and-over 
population versus 0.71 to 0.64 in the under-65 population). 
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[Figure 1 about here] 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
3. Average health spending over the life cycle 
Figure 2 shows life-cycle profiles of mean total health spending, based on the synthetic cohort im-
plicit in our data. Several notable trends emerge. Except at the extremes of the age distribution, 
there is a general increase in spending with age, accelerating as the person approaches Medicare 
eligibility at age 65. The discrete drop at age 65 reflects the transition of insurance coverage from a 
private, employer-sponsored plan to Medicare. There are at least three reasons such a drop could 
occur. First, not every person in the under-65 range would qualify for retiree coverage from these 
employers upon turning 65, so a healthier subset may be ageing into Medicare (because healthier 
people may be more likely to qualify for employer-related Medicare supplemental coverage because 
they amassed enough service at the firm to qualify). Second, benefits change at age 65, so the plan 
design also changes, which can affect covered utilisation. Third, private plans typically pay providers 
more than Medicare plans. Therefore, this drop may also reflect a change in prices more than any 
change in utilisation for those who do qualify for coverage (utilisation changes are more likely at age 
65 for those transitioning from being uninsured to gaining Medicare coverage, but our sample is 
continuously insured). 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
V. Modelling health expenditures 
In this section, we implement different dynamic econometric models to better understand the fac-
tors behind our findings about the concentration of health expenditures. First, we model continuous 
measures of health expenditures using error components models that decompose the total variabil-
ity of health expenditures into transitory and permanent components. Then, we apply dynamic 
models for categorical variables to the probability of being in the top decile of health expenditure. 
For all of these models, we incorporate in our analysis additional individual information, including 
trajectories of co-morbidities and trauma episodes.  





These methods are based on normal or log-normal distributions. There is a debate in the literature 
regarding the best way to model the distribution of health costs, especially given some commonly-
observed features such as skewness, excess zeros, multimodality and heavy right tails. For example, 
there could be a bias if the distribution of health expenditures is more skewed than what is assumed 
by the traditional log-normal assumption. In this case, the distribution may be fitted better by a Pa-
reto or truncated log-normal with an attached Pareto. Feenberg and Skinner (1994) assume that the 
cross-sectional distribution of health care costs is log-normal and find that log health costs are well 
represented by an ARMA(1,1) process.3 Rust and Phelan (1997) argue that the right tail of the health 
cost distribution is better represented by a Pareto distribution, which has a fatter right tail than a 
log-normal distribution, even though they do not formally test their Pareto specification against a 
log-normal alternative, nor do they account for the persistence of health costs. French and Jones 
(2004) find that the stochastic process for log health costs is well modelled as the sum of a white-
noise process and a highly-persistent AR(1) process, with the innovations to this process modelled 
using a normal distribution adjusted to better capture the risk of extreme health cost shocks. Mihay-
lova et al. (2011) review several statistical methods for analysing health care resource use and costs 
and assess their ability to address skewness, excess zeros, multimodality and heavy right tails. They 
conclude that simple methods are preferred in large samples, where sample means are more likely 
to be normally distributed. Additionally, in some cases, methods able to deal with more specific data 
characteristics may be preferable, but checking sensitivity to assumptions is necessary. This would 
be the case, for example, when the data are skewed and/or heavy tailed, where we can model the 
costs using alternative distributions instead of normality. The authors recommend the use of inverse 
gamma and log-normal distributions, but checking the results for robustness to implementation op-
tions and outliers in the data. 
1. Error components models 
The objective here is to study the autocorrelation structure of the health spending process,    , in 
order to better understand the intertemporal persistence of health care spending. To do this, we 
employ a commonly-used error components model: 
(1)              
where     is health expenditure for individual i at time t,     is a vector of explanatory variables in-
cluding time-varying characteristics, and     is the residual term. We focus on the decomposition of 
the residual term     as the sum of a permanent component,   , and a transitory one,      
(2)                
where    and     are random variables with mean zero and variances   
  and    
  respectively, and pt 
and λt are factor loadings that allow these variances to change over time in a way that is common 
across individuals. Our main objective is to identify the separate roles played by the permanent and 
transitory shocks, and to examine how these roles may have changed over time. 
 
3ARMA stands for autoregressive moving-average. 
 
 





This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
The estimation procedure consists of two stages. In the first stage, we estimate the parameter vec-
tor β by regressing health costs on demographic and health-related variables that forecast future 
health costs. In the second stage, we estimate the covariance matrix of the residuals from the first-
step regression and fit it to the model using a generalised method of moments (GMM) approach.  
We follow previous work in the literature4 to model persistence in the transitory shocks    . First, we 
use an AR(1) process so that  
(3)                 
where     is a random variable with variance   
  and the variance of νi,t=1 is given by    
 .  
A more elaborate specification that is also widely used in the literature models the transitory shock 
using an ARMA process with parameter  . In this case, 
(4)                          
The relatively simple models in (3) and (4) capture important features of expenditure dynamics – 
namely, time-varying parameters and serial correlation of the transitory shocks.  
The model is estimated by GMM using the identity weighting matrix, where sample moments are 
matched to population moments. Given T periods of data, we have          moment conditions. 
The parameter vector to be estimated is given by 
(5)      
      
     
                    . 
For the implementation of this model, we follow the approach in French and Jones (2004) to esti-
mate the first step using the log of health expenditures as the dependent variable and recoding all 
health care costs below $500 (including reports of no expenditures) to $500.5 For the second step, 
we estimate the autocorrelation structure of the health cost process residual using the GMM ap-
proach from Doris, O’Neill and Sweetman (2010). 
Table 6 presents the empirical covariance matrix used to match the sample moments according to 
the chosen model. This matrix again reflects the persistence in health expenditures even after five 
years. Most of the observed drop occurs in the first year, with only gradual declines thereafter. Table 
7 presents the parameter estimates obtained using the GMM approach. The two models yield simi-
lar conclusions. The estimate for   indicates low persistence in the transitory shock, though it is 
somewhat larger in the oldest age group than in the younger subsamples. The factor loadings    to 
 
4For example, Feenberg and Skinner (1994). 
5Our results are robust to other bottom-coding decisions (at $250 and $750). 





   and    to    indicate relatively constant transitory and permanent variances over time, with 
somewhat lower values in the oldest group than in the younger subsamples. Still, we conduct a Wald 
test to evaluate the null hypothesis that the permanent factor loadings    are constant over time 
and we are able to reject this hypothesis at the 1 per cent significance level. Given the similarity of 
the parameters over time, the rejection likely results primarily from the large sample size. 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
[Table 7 about here] 
2. Modelling the probability of high health expenditure 
In this subsection, we analyse categories of health expenditures, by modelling the probability of be-
ing in the highest decile of spending using a dynamic probit model that accounts for individual-
specific unobserved heterogeneity. That is,  
(6)   (     |                   )                     
where     is an indicator for being in the top 10 per cent of spenders, based on medical and drug 
payments in each year t.     is again a vector of explanatory variables,    represents individual unob-
served heterogeneity and     is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. Note that 
the model assumes that dynamic effects are of the first order, once     and    are accounted for (so 
that only        appears on the right-hand side of (6)). Predicted probabilities and other parameters 
of interest are based on the following conditional expectation function: 
(7)                                       
where the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of   . Wooldridge (2005) uses con-
venient distributional assumptions (including one for the unobserved individual effects,   ) to show 
that the likelihood function for the outcome of interest has exactly the same structure as in the 
standard random effects probit model, except that the explanatory variables at time t are 
(                )  Then, we can consistently estimate predicted probabilities with the following es-
timator: 
(8)  ̂  
 
 
∑  ( ̂   ̂     ̂     ̂      )
 
    
which can be evaluated at different values of        and    . We can also compute changes or deriva-
tives of this expression with respect to     or        to obtain the main effect of interest. Finally, we 
use the delta method to obtain the standard errors. 
Tables 8 and 9 present the results for this model. First, we estimate dynamic probit models as in 
Wooldridge (2005), including all the explanatory variables listed in the tables. Then, we compute the 
estimated probability of being in the top 10 per cent of spenders in year t conditional on each varia-
ble indicated in the rows, and on having been in the top 10 per cent in year t–1 (Table 8) or on not 
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having been in the top 10 per cent in year t–1 (Table 9). It is important to note that by controlling for 
the initial condition     (the value of the indicator variable in 2003), these results are not directly 
comparable to the transition matrices reported in Table 4. 
 
[Table 8 about here] 
[Table 9 about here] 
 
We find some interesting general patterns. First, persistence by demographic characteristics is gen-
erally lower than persistence by co-morbidities. Because co-morbidities are harder to assess, par-
ticularly for new enrollees, than demographics, this highlights the need for robust risk prediction 
models. Second, people with a co-morbid condition relative to those without the condition are con-
siderably more likely to be in the top 10 per cent of spenders in year t regardless of whether they 
were in the top 10 per cent in year t–1. However, people with a co-morbid condition are even more 
likely to be in the top 10 per cent in year t if they were also in the top 10 per cent in year t–1. For 
example, when congestive heart failure is present, the probability of being in the top 10 per cent of 
spenders is 0.27 conditional on having been in the top 10 per cent in the prior year (Table 8) versus 
0.17 conditional on not having been in the top 10 per cent in the prior year (Table 9). For most con-
ditions, the differential between those with a given co-morbidity who were and were not in the top 
10 per cent in the previous year indicates that being in the top 10 per cent increases the probability 
of remaining in the top 10 per cent by 5–11 percentage points. These findings imply that knowledge 
of either co-morbidity status or prior spending will not predict subsequent spending nearly as well as 
knowledge of both factors. Third, those most likely to be in and remain in the top 10 per cent are 
those with myocardial infarction, congestive heart failure, peptic ulcer disease and in several psychi-
atric diagnostic groupings, which indicates that these conditions might be appropriate targets for 
longer-term disease management programmes. Fourth, although most conditions are less common 
at younger ages, when they do occur they are more predictive of persistently high spending at 
younger ages, as almost all conditions have the highest predicted probabilities on being in the top 10 
per cent of spenders in the following year when they occur at ages under 25 and the lowest predict-
ed probabilities when they occur in the 65-and-over population. Essentially, the presence of a condi-
tion at a younger age more clearly differentiates a person’s health care trajectory from that of their 
peers. 






This study adds to our knowledge of spending persistence in the US in several ways. First, it studies a 
large population of privately-insured individuals under the age of 65. Relatively little recent and 
broadly representative information is available for this population. Second, we also include an im-
portant subgroup of the Medicare-eligible population aged 65 and over – those holding both Medi-
care and privately-provided supplementary coverage. In both of these age groups, considerable 
persistence is evident at both ends of the spending distribution using a number of metrics and mod-
elling approaches. The error components models supplement the descriptive data by demonstrating 
the relative magnitudes of the transitory and permanent components of shocks to spending. The 
dynamic probit models quantify the independent contributions of co-morbidities and prior history of 
high spending to the likelihood of future high spending. 
Greater knowledge of long-term persistence and its predictors can be useful to policymakers and 
insurers both for predictive purposes and to help guide the design of interventions. An example of 
the predictive value of such information is being able to better anticipate the self-selection incen-
tives of potential enrollees. Given the lower-than-anticipated enrolment in health plans offered 
through the ACA’s health insurance exchanges, premiums in some states have risen sharply to re-
flect the relatively sicker-than-anticipated set of enrollees,6 and insurers are still trying to improve 
their predictive capabilities as those markets stabilise over time. In terms of intervention design, the 
varying magnitudes of persistence seen across conditions can inform the targeting of cost-control 
strategies. Patients likely to face greater persistence of high spending might be better targeted by 
chronic disease management programmes or enhanced benefits (for example, Medicare’s coverage 
for self-management training and medical nutrition services for diabetes patients) that focus on con-
trolling progression and complications of underlying conditions. Conversely, those whose high 
spending is more likely to be transient might be more appropriately targeted by high-cost case man-
agement interventions that focus on managing short-term utilisation of expensive interventions and 
coordination across care settings. Persistence also has important implications for the evaluation of 
interventions targeting patients with high levels of spending. For example, our results suggest that 
about half of very high spenders (those in the top quintile) would not be in the top quintile the fol-
lowing year even in the absence of any intervention to reduce spending. This underscores the im-
portance of a control group in any evaluation of programmes targeting high utilisers.  
Another key finding is that drug spending is substantially more persistent than medical spending, 
suggesting that drug coverage might be particularly vulnerable to adverse selection issues in volun-
tary systems of coverage. In fact, Medicare’s Part D drug coverage has several design features (high-
er premiums for those who delay enrolment, relatively generous coverage for initial expenditures 
rather than having a large deductible) specifically intended to address this issue by making coverage 
more attractive to relatively healthy individuals.  
 
6Blue Cross Blue Shield, 2016. 
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Finally, the high degree of spending persistence seen in these data, particularly among patients with 
certain conditions, suggests that the increasingly-common high-deductible health plans seen in the 
US may leave many individuals facing persistently high out-of-pocket costs over time. Insurance cov-
erage and benefit design changes (for example, level of deductible and other cost-sharing require-
ments, use of value-based insurance design (V-BID) features to reduce cost sharing for evidence-
based services used by chronically ill people) could provide greater protection from financial risk 
while limiting adverse incentives to skimp on potentially valuable care. 
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  Whole 
sample 





65 and over 
Age (years)  42.59 41.70 43.37 9.52 45.31 73.25 
Male  0.47 1.00 0.00 0.51 0.46 0.45 
Urban area indicator 0.79 0.79 0.78 0.80 0.78 0.79 




48.63 48.99 48.32 50.99 48.63 45.89 
Union worker indicator
b
 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.16 0.21 0.45 
         
Region Northeast 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.12 
  North Central 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.28 0.29 0.46 
  South 0.33 0.32 0.34 0.32 0.35 0.28 
  West 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.29 0.26 0.13 
         
Employment  Active full-time 0.70 0.72 0.69 0.95 0.83 0.01 
status Early retiree 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.11 0.01 
 Other 0.23 0.22 0.24 0.04 0.06 0.98 
         
Benefit plan
c
 PPO 0.35 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.38 0.24 
  HMO 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.33 0.26 0.01 
  POS 0.13 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.00 
  Other 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.17 0.20 0.75 
         
Medical  2003 2,966 2,693 3,205 1,191 3,056 4,782 
spending ($) 2004 3,349 3,062 3,600 1,242 3,455 5,508 
  2005 3,654 3,373 3,902 1,318 3,753 6,107 
  2006 3,848 3,580 4,083 1,406 4,003 6,254 
  2007 4,307 4,042 4,539 1,543 4,395 7,295 
  2008 5,038 4,813 5,235 1,654 4,981 9,205 
         
Prescription  2003 1,256 1,138 1,359 298 1,170 2,648 
drug spending  2004 1,401 1,277 1,510 331 1,302 2,967 
($) 2005 1,471 1,356 1,572 368 1,381 3,048 
  2006 1,541 1,438 1,632 398 1,491 3,046 
  2007 1,594 1,502 1,676 426 1,565 3,064 
  2008 1,639 1,561 1,708 439 1,633 3,074 
         
Total  2003 4,222 3,831 4,564 1,488 4,227 7,429 
spending ($)  2004 4,750 4,339 5,110 1,573 4,757 8,475 
  2005 5,126 4,729 5,474 1,686 5,135 9,155 
  2006 5,390 5,019 5,715 1,803 5,493 9,301 
  2007 5,901 5,543 6,215 1,969 5,960 10,359 
  2008 6,677 6,374 6,944 2,093 6,614 12,279 
Sample size  3,177,267 1,485,211 1,692,056 713,693 1,858,557 605,017 
aAdjusted to 2014 US dollars. 
bProportion that are members of a trade/professional union. 
cHMO = health maintenance organisation; POS = point of service; PPO = preferred provider organisation. 





Note: Spending is adjusted to 2014 US dollars using the personal consumption expenditure price index. The rest of the variables corre-
spond to the year 2003. 
TABLE 2 








% of total Average 
spending 
($) 
% of total Average 
spending 
($) 
% of total 
All 5,344 100.0 3,860 100.0 1,484 100.0 
95–100% 40,755 45.8 35,384 55.0 9,826 39.7 
90–95% 14,236 13.3 10,251 13.3 4,620 15.6 
70–90% 6,876 25.7 4,151 21.5 2,366 31.9 
50–70% 2,747 10.3 1,344 7.0 770 10.4 








% of total Average 
spending 
($) 
% of total Average 
spending 
($) 
% of total 
All 4,322 100.0 3,214 100.0 1,109 100.0 
95–100% 35,542 49.3 30,624 57.2 8,650 46.8 
90–95% 11,338 13.1 8,277 12.9 3,414 15.4 
70–90% 5,211 24.1 3,257 20.3 1,554 28.0 
50–70% 1,963 9.1 1,048 6.5 442 8.0 
0–50% 384 4.3 207 3.2 40 1.8 
Aged 65 and over 
Spending 
percentile 




% of total Average 
spending 
($) 
% of total Average 
spending 
($) 
% of total 
All 9,551 100.0 6,522 100.0 3,029 100.0 
95–100% 55,200 34.7 49,510 45.5 12,031 23.8 
90–95% 23,746 12.4 18,456 14.1 7,081 11.7 
70–90% 12,798 26.8 8,141 25.0 4,767 31.5 
50–70% 6,731 14.1 3,204 9.8 2,861 18.9 
0–50% 2,339 12.0 735 5.5 872 14.1 
Note: Adjusted to 2014 dollars. 
TABLE 3 
Correlation of spending (in levels) in year t with spending in years t+1 to t+5 
All 
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
Total 0.38 0.29 0.25 0.23 0.20 
Medical 0.31 0.21 0.17 0.15 0.13 
Drugs 0.85 0.76 0.67 0.61 0.57 
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Aged 0–64 
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
Total 0.41 0.30 0.25 0.22 0.19 
Medical 0.33 0.23 0.18 0.15 0.13 
Drugs 0.85 0.75 0.66 0.59 0.56 
Aged 65 and over 
  t+1 t+2 t+3 t+4 t+5 
Total 0.29 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.17 
Medical 0.23 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.12 








All Aged 0–64 Aged 65 and over 
Quintile next year Quintile next year Quintile next year 
Bot-
tom 
Second Third Fourth Top Bot-
tom 
Second Third Fourth Top Bot-
tom 
Second Third Fourth Top 
Bottom 59.7 26.0 8.4 3.5 2.3 56.1 26.3 10.2 4.5 2.9 65.6 20.0 7.0 4.0 3.5 
Second 24.3 39.9 22.7 8.3 4.9 24.5 37.1 23.4 9.5 5.5 17.4 40.9 23.7 10.8 7.2 
Third 9.0 20.6 38.0 22.6 9.8 10.6 21.3 35.0 22.7 10.4 7.2 20.3 35.0 24.5 13.0 
Fourth  4.1 8.5 20.6 41.9 25.0 5.3 9.7 20.8 39.9 24.4 4.8 10.6 21.3 36.8 26.6 




All Aged 0–64 Aged 65 and over 
Quintile two years later Quintile two years later Quintile two years later 
Bot-
tom 
Second Third Fourth Top Bot-
tom 
Second Third Fourth Top Bot-
tom 
Second Third Fourth Top 
Bottom 55.9 26.7 10.2 4.4 2.9 52.5 26.5 11.9 5.6 3.6 60.1 21.5 8.6 5.0 4.8 
Second 24.4 36.8 23.6 9.6 5.6 24.2 34.5 23.9 11.1 6.3 18.6 36.0 24.4 12.5 8.6 
Third 10.6 20.8 34.2 23.5 11.0 12.0 21.3 31.7 23.5 11.6 8.8 20.5 31.1 25.0 14.7 
Fourth  5.3 9.6 20.7 38.2 26.2 6.6 10.9 20.8 36.3 25.3 6.1 12.0 21.3 33.2 27.4 




All Aged 0–64 Aged 65 and over 
Quintile five years later Quintile five years later Quintile five years later 
Bot-
tom 
Second Third Fourth Top Bot-
tom 
Second Third Fourth Top Bot-
tom 
Second Third Fourth Top 
Bottom 48.4 28.1 13.5 6.0 4.0 45.4 27.1 15.1 7.6 4.8 50.6 23.4 11.7 7.3 7.0 
Second 24.7 32.0 24.3 12.1 7.0 23.8 30.1 24.4 13.8 7.9 20.0 29.7 24.2 15.4 10.8 
Third 13.7 20.9 28.4 23.9 13.1 14.8 21.2 26.9 23.6 13.5 11.7 20.2 26.0 24.9 17.2 
Fourth  7.7 11.6 20.6 32.7 27.4 9.3 13.2 20.5 31.0 26.1 8.6 14.2 20.9 28.2 28.0 
Top 5.6 7.5 13.2 25.3 48.5 6.7 8.4 13.2 23.9 47.7 9.1 12.6 17.1 24.2 36.9 






Measures of the concentration of total health spending over one to six years 
  Total health spending averaged over: 
 
1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 6 years 
All 
 
   
  Gini coefficient for total spending 0.69 0.66 0.64 0.63 0.62 0.62 
Percentage spent by top 1% of spenders 27.2% 22.9% 20.9% 19.6% 18.8% 18.2% 
Percentage spent by top 10% of spenders 59.1% 54.2% 51.6% 49.9% 48.7% 47.9% 
  
 




   
  Gini coefficient for total spending 0.71 0.69 0.67 0.65 0.64 0.64 
Percentage spent by top 1% of spenders 30.5% 26.3% 24.1% 22.8% 21.8% 21.2% 
Percentage spent by top 10% of spenders 62.5% 57.6% 55.0% 53.3% 52.2% 51.3% 
  
 
   
  
Aged 65 and over 
 
   
  Gini coefficient for total spending 0.57 0.53 0.50 0.48 0.47 0.46 
Percentage spent by top 1% of spenders 18.7% 15.2% 13.6% 12.7% 12.0% 11.5% 




Empirical covariance matrix 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
2003 1.32 0.49 0.43 0.39 0.36 0.33 
2004 0.66 1.35 0.49 0.43 0.39 0.36 
2005 0.57 0.67 1.35 0.49 0.43 0.39 
2006 0.52 0.58 0.67 1.37 0.49 0.43 
2007 0.48 0.53 0.58 0.68 1.37 0.49 
2008 0.44 0.49 0.53 0.59 0.68 1.39 
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TABLE 7 
Error components model 
Parame-
ters 
All Male Female Aged 0–24 Aged 25–64 Aged 65 and 
over 






























































  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) 



















































  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 



















































































































































































































































 (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.012) (0.002) (0.008) (0.004) (0.014) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.024) 





























  (0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.012) (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) (0.013) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.025) 
F-test 
for p 
10,886 382.8 10,924 445.2 10,866 378.7 5,702 268.2 15,110 1,045 7,576 602.5 
Prob > 
F 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *** indicates coefficients that are significant at the 1 per cent level. 
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TABLE 8 
Dynamic random effects probit regressions: 
estimated probability of being in the top 10 per cent of spenders in year t conditional on being in the top 10 per 
cent in the previous year 
Dependent variable: indicator for being in the top 10 per cent of total medical spending in year t 
  All Male Female Aged 0–24 Aged 25–64 Aged 65 and 
over 
Male 0.16***   0.16*** 0.13*** 0.15*** 
 (0.001)   (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Female 0.13***   0.18*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 
  (0.001)     (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Urban area 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Rural area 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.19*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
Region       
Northeast 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.17*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
North Central 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
South 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
West 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.17*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
Employee classification       
Union worker indicator 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
Non-union worker indicator 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Employment status       
Active full-time 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.17*** 0.14*** 0.12*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.006) 
Early retiree 0.12*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) 
Other 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.20*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.017) 
Plan type       
PPO 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
HMO 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.18*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.025) 
POS 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.16*** 0.13*** 0.19*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.009) 
Other 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
Trauma 0.25*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.39*** 0.25*** 0.26*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) 





No trauma 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) 
Co-morbidities       
Myocardial infarction 0.40*** 0.43*** 0.43*** 0.65*** 0.60*** 0.29*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.01) (0.131) (0.01) (0.008) 
Congestive heart failure 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.30*** 0.67*** 0.37*** 0.22*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.065) (0.008) (0.005) 
Peripheral vascular disease 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.50*** 0.27*** 0.14*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.069) (0.007) (0.004) 
Dementia 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.07*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.005) (0.005) 
Cerebrovascular disease 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.23*** 0.58*** 0.30*** 0.16*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.031) (0.005) (0.004) 
Chronic pulmonary disease 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.31*** 0.20*** 0.14*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
Rheumatologic disease or con-
nective tissue  
0.25*** 0.22*** 0.25*** 0.51*** 0.29*** 0.17*** 
disease (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.035) (0.006) (0.006) 
Peptic ulcer disease 0.29*** 0.28*** 0.29*** 0.47*** 0.33*** 0.16*** 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.046) (0.010) (0.008) 
Mild liver disease 0.25*** 0.23*** 0.25*** 0.60*** 0.29*** 0.15*** 
 (0.009) (0.014) (0.013) (0.092) (0.012) (0.016) 
Hemiplegia or paraplegia 0.20*** 0.19*** 0.21*** 0.41*** 0.23*** 0.13*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.027) (0.009) (0.006) 
Moderate or severe renal dis-
ease 
0.16*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.27*** 0.18*** 0.12*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.017) (0.003) (0.003) 
Diabetes 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.55*** 0.19*** 0.11*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.015) (0.003) (0.003) 
Non-metastatic cancer 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.18*** 0.32*** 0.20*** 0.12*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.003) 
Moderate or severe liver disease 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.23*** 0.16*** 0.09*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.028) (0.006) (0.006) 
Metastatic solid tumour 0.14*** 0.12*** 0.14*** 0.24*** 0.15*** 0.10*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.017) (0.002) (0.003) 
Diabetes + complications 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 0.25*** 0.15*** 0.09*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.032) (0.003) (0.003) 
AIDS 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.19*** 0.16*** 0.11*** 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (0.003) (0.007) 
Psychiatric diagnostic groupings 
category  
      
Organic mental disorders  0.26*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.45*** 0.29*** 0.25*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.022) (0.009) (0.007) 
Alcohol use disorders  0.25*** 0.25*** 0.22*** 0.34*** 0.27*** 0.24*** 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.011) (0.019) (0.009) (0.022) 
Opioid and other substance use 
disorders  
0.28*** 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.38*** 0.29*** 0.22*** 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.005) (0.013) 
Schizophrenia disorders  0.23*** 0.22*** 0.24*** 0.48*** 0.25*** 0.20*** 
 (0.013) (0.019) (0.020) (0.065) (0.018) (0.030) 
Other psychotic disorders (NEC, 
NOS) 
0.26*** 0.28*** 0.26*** 0.39*** 0.25*** 0.24*** 
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 (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.020) (0.011) (0.009) 
Bipolar disorders 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.25*** 0.44*** 0.25*** 0.23*** 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.007) (0.017) (0.007) (0.016) 
Major depressions 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.33*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.008) 
Other specific & atypical affec-
tive disorders 
0.19*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.31*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.011) 
Post traumatic stress disorders  0.18*** 0.16*** 0.18*** 0.34*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 
 (0.008) (0.012) (0.010) (0.026) (0.009) (0.036) 
Anxiety disorders (NOS) 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.27*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) 
Personality disorders 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.33*** 0.20*** 0.22*** 
 (0.014) (0.023) (0.018) (0.046) (0.018) (0.042) 
Impulse control, adjustment 
disorders and  
0.19*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.29*** 0.19*** 0.22*** 
other mental disorders  (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) 
Note: Predicted probabilities are constructed by setting the corresponding row indicator variable and the lagged indicator for being in the 
top 10 per cent of spenders equal to 1, then taking the average over all the other variables included in the model. Standard errors are 
shown in parentheses. *** indicates coefficients that are significant at the 1 per cent level. 






Dynamic random effects probit regressions: 
estimated probability of being in the top 10 per cent of spenders in year t conditional on not being in the top 10 
per cent in the previous year 
Dependent variable: indicator for being in the top 10 per cent of total medical spending in year t 




0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 
 (0.000) 
  
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Female 0.08*** 
  
0.09*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 
  (0.000)     (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Urban area 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Rural area 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Region 
      Northeast 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
North Central 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
South 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
West 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Employee classification 
      Union worker indicator 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Non-union worker indicator 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Employment status 
      Active full-time 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.06*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
Early retiree 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Other 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.12*** 
  (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.012) 
Plan type 
      PPO 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
HMO 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.11*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.017) 
POS 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.12*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) 
Other 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Trauma 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.23*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) 
No trauma 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Co-morbidities 
      Myocardial infarction 0.29*** 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.17*** 
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 (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.138) (0.009) (0.005) 
Congestive heart failure 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.49*** 0.25*** 0.12*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.071) (0.006) (0.002) 
Peripheral vascular disease 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.32*** 0.17*** 0.07*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.060) (0.005) (0.002) 
Dementia 0.04*** 0.03*** 0.04*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.03*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
Cerebrovascular disease 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.39*** 0.19*** 0.08*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.029) (0.003) (0.002) 
Chronic pulmonary disease 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.17*** 0.12*** 0.07*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Rheumatologic disease or con-
nective tissue  0.16*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.33*** 0.18*** 0.09*** 
disease (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.031) (0.004) (0.003) 
Peptic ulcer disease 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.30*** 0.21*** 0.09*** 
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.039) (0.008) (0.005) 
Mild liver disease 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.41*** 0.18*** 0.07*** 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.092) (0.009) (0.009) 
Hemiplegia or paraplegia 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.25*** 0.14*** 0.07*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.022) (0.006) (0.003) 
Moderate or severe renal dis-
ease 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.14*** 0.11*** 0.06*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.011) (0.002) (0.001) 
Diabetes 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.37*** 0.11*** 0.05*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.013) (0.001) (0.001) 
Non-metastatic cancer 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.17*** 0.12*** 0.06*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) 
Moderate or severe liver disease 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.04*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.017) (0.004) (0.003) 
Metastatic solid tumour 0.08*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.13*** 0.08*** 0.05*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.001) (0.001) 
Diabetes + complications 0.07*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.13*** 0.08*** 0.04*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.020) (0.001) (0.001) 
AIDS 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.05*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.004) 
Psychiatric diagnostic groupings 
category  
      Organic mental disorders  0.17*** 0.18*** 0.16*** 0.28*** 0.19*** 0.15*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.018) (0.007) (0.004) 
Alcohol use disorders  0.16*** 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.19*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) (0.013) (0.006) (0.016) 
Opioid and other substance use 
disorders  0.19*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.22*** 0.19*** 0.13*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.011) (0.004) (0.009) 
Schizophrenia disorders  0.15*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.30*** 0.16*** 0.12*** 
 (0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.056) (0.014) (0.020) 
Other psychotic disorders (NEC, 
NOS) 0.17*** 0.19*** 0.16*** 0.23*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.015) (0.008) (0.006) 





Bipolar disorders 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.27*** 0.16*** 0.14*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.014) (0.005) (0.011) 
Major depressions 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.18*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.005) 
Other specific & atypical affec-
tive disorders 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.17*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 
 (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007) 
Post traumatic stress disorders  0.12*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.19*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.018) (0.006) (0.024) 
Anxiety disorders (NOS) 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.14*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) 
Personality disorders 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.19*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 
 (0.010) (0.016) (0.012) (0.033) (0.012) (0.030) 
Impulse control, adjustment 
disorders and  0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.16*** 0.12*** 0.13*** 
other mental disorders  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) 
Note: Predicted probabilities are constructed by setting the corresponding row indicator variable equal to 1 and the lagged indicator for 
being in the top 10 per cent of spenders equal to 0, then taking the average over all the other variables included in the model. Standard 
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